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Data protection and multi-application smart
cards e the use of intelligent servers to ensure
interoperability and data flow requirements
Ewout Keuleers, Jean-Marc Dinant
CRID e University of Namur, Belgium
Abstract This is the third part of a paper, commenced in CLSR in 2003e2004, that
looked at the data protection implications of multi-application smart cards.
Technical solutions were then canvassed to demonstrate that any privacy concerns
could be overcome. In this final part, the authors look at the use of the card over
communications networks and EU regulation of the data protection implications.
 2005 Ewout Keuleers and Jean-Marc Dinant. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights
reserved.A. Introduction
Multi-application smart cards are becoming more
andmore common. In order to take benefit from the
opportunities offered by multi-application smart
card schemes, e.g., the generation of value-added
information or services, authorities at different
tiers are underway implementing local and national
smart card schemes. However, from a privacy point
of view, the use of such ‘‘universal’’ cards, in-
corporating various applications, is not without
concerns. Although cross-profiling is not unlawful
by definition and an analysis of the collected data
E-mail addresses: ewout.keuleers@fundp.ac.be, ictlaw@
gmail.com (E. Keuleers), jmdinant@fundp.ac.be (J.-M. Dinant).0267-3649/$ - see front matter  2005 Ewout Keuleers and Jean-M
doi:10.1016/j.clsr.2005.02.001can be legitimate, it is clear that such tech-
nologies can also be used for other purposes. To
avoid the creation of George Orwell’s 1984 Big
Brother, the implementation and exploitation of
multi-application smart card schemesmust respond
to some basic preliminary requirements.
In the first part of this paper,1 we dealt with the
privacy principles regarding the use of global
unique identifiers for the cross-profiling of person-
al data of smart card holders. In addition to the
role of each actor concerned, notably the appli-
cation providers and smart card manufacturer, we
commented on the legal constraints to develop
1 Ewout Keuleers and Jean-Marc Dinant, ‘‘Data protection:
multi-application smart cards: the use of global unique
identifiers for cross-profiling purposes’’, [2003] 19 CLSR 480.arc Dinant. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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technical solutions were proposed to demonstrate
that multi-application smart card technology can
be reconciled with the principles of personal data
protection legislation. In this respect three tech-
nical solutions were analysed and criticized. While
the first two solutions relate to the role and
functioning of the scheme’s application providers,
the third solution consists out of the development
of less privacy-infringing smart card technology in
relation to the use of unique identifiers.
In this third and final part, we will asses the flow
of personal data over the multi-application smart
card’s communication networks, interconnecting
the different application providers. In this analy-
sis, the use of so-called intelligent servers to
increase the multi-application smart card’s inter-
operability and the role of the communication
provider will be central.
B. SmartHub: privacy and intelligent
servers
The implementation of so-called ‘intelligent serv-
ers’ in a multi-application smart card scheme (MSC)
is a valuable contribution to the overall success of
such a scheme. The scheme’s open architecturewill
make it possible to integrate additional applications
in the existing configuration, without many techni-
cal constraints. In addition, an intelligent server, for
instance SmartCities’ SmartHub, guarantees the
interoperability between the different application
providers of a local smart card scheme and the in-
teroperability between different (local) schemes.3
The objective of SmartCities,4 SmartHub is to
design a centrally managed high-performance en-
gine, for data movement and interface manage-
ment across multi-application smart card scheme
applications, to complete the open architecture
developed by the existing SmartCities project.5
To illustrate the added value of SmartHub, the
following illustration can be given.
In order to avoid a card holder having to register
each time he intends to make use of a new scheme
service, e.g., swimming pool, library, etc. the
concerned application provider can use the holder’s
smart card to identify the card holder and to
2 Jean-Marc Dinant and Ewout Keuleers, ‘‘Data protection:
multi-application smart cards: the use of global unique
identifiers for cross-profiling purposes, towards a privacy
enhancing smart card engineering’’, [2004] 20 CLSR 22.
3 Cf., infra on public networks and pan-European smart card
schemes.
4 www.smartcities.gov.uk.
5 SmartHub Business White Paper, Black Sea Consulting,
August 2002.retrieve personal data from the centrally managed
data base.6 Therefore, frequently used data e for
instance name, surname, address, phone number,
date of birth, etc., will only have to be asked once
and will be stored and kept up to date in the central
data base. Therefore, the centrally managed per-
sonal data do not have to be asked for over and over
and can be sent whenever and wherever needed.
The centrally placed SmartHub assures the inter-
operability between the different application pro-
viders and the central data base of the MSC scheme,
and thus the proper data flow in the MSC scheme.
Before assessing the privacy constraints on the
development and implementation of SmartHub,
a distinction should be made between the legality
of the MSC scheme as such and SmartHub’s role in
this configuration.7 On the one hand, one should
consider to what extent Directive 95/46/EC allows
the central management and processing of per-
sonal data, notably the free data flow between the
scheme’s application providers.8 On the other
hand, the integration of SmartHub in a multi-
application smart card scheme brings forward the
following two issues.
In the first place, one should consider the
application of the general data protection princi-
ples contained in Directive 95/46/EC. Secondly
and considering the fact that personal data will be
communicated over a network, one has to consider
the principles of Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy
in electronic communications networks.9 In re-
lation to the latter Directive, the focus will be on
the proper nature of the smart card communica-
tions network, connecting the different applica-
tions and actors. If this is a private network, this
Directive is not applicable. If, on the contrary, the
network is considered a public one, the principles
laid down in this Directive become applicable.
C. Application of Directive 95/46/EC
Recital 47 of Directive 95/46/EC states that:
‘‘where a message containing personal data is
6 This central database has to be distinguished from the
central data warehouse. SmartCities’ Data warehouse contains
the anonymous data used to make global cross-profiles of the
card holders.
7 In this regard, we refer to the first two parts of this
contribution on data sharing and the use of global unique
identifiers (GUI).
8 Cf., articles 6 and 7 of Directive 95/46/EC.
9 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communi-
cations sector, Official Journal L 201, 31/07/2002 P. 0037 e
0047.
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Figure 1 SmartHub: data controller or processor?transmitted by means of a telecommunications or
electronicmail service, the sole purpose ofwhich is
the transmission of suchmessages, the controller in
respect of the personal data contained in the
message will normally be considered to be the
person from whom the message originates, rather
than the person offering the transmission services;
whereas, nevertheless, those offering such services
will normally be considered controllers in respect
of the processing of the additional personal data
necessary for the operation of the service’’.
In this regard, the following conclusions can be
made.10 In the first place, the application pro-
viders present in a multi-application smart card
scheme are and remain controllers for the data
contained in the communicated message or con-
tent. We underline that it is possible that a number
of persons are jointly considered controllers within
the meaning of Directive 95/46/EC. In the second
place, communication providers such as SmartHub
will only be considered data controllers in respect
of the additional personal data created to provide
their service11 such as, for instance, traffic data. In
this hypothesis, it will be SmartHub’s responsibility
to comply with data protection legislation and,
e.g., to inform the data subjects of the kind of
personal data being processed and for what pur-
poses.12 Eventually, if no additional data necessary
for the provision of the service are generated,
SmartHub will be storing and transmitting personal
data on behalf of the application providers, i.e.,
the data controllers. In this view, SmartHub can be
qualified data processor Fig 1.
Nevertheless and irrespective of the qualification
of processor and/or controller, both the data
10 Also see Cécile de Terwange and Sophie Louveaux, ‘‘Data
protection and Online Networks’’, Computer Law & Security
Report, [1997] 13 CLSR 237.
11 See also recital 26 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
12 Cf. article 6.2 of Directive 95/46/EC and article 10 of
Directive 1995/46/EC.controllers and processors must adopt appropriate
technical and organizational measures to protect
personal data against unlawful destruction or acci-
dental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or
access, in particular where the processing involves
the transmission of data over a network, and against
all other unlawful forms of processing.13
D. Application of Directive 2002/58/EC
Article 3 of Directive 2002/58/EC states that:
‘‘this Directive shall apply to the processing of
personal data in connection with the provision of
publicly available electronic communications
services in public communications networks in
the Community’’.
In order to determine whether this Directive is
applicable or not, the following two questions have
to be answered:
- Is the service provided an electronic commu-
nications service?
- Is the service concerned provided over a public
network?
1. An electronic communications service
By virtue of the Framework Directive for electronic
communications,14 an ‘‘electronic communica-
tions service’’ is defined as: ‘‘a service normally
provided for remuneration which consists wholly
or mainly in the conveyance of signals on
electronic communications networks, including
telecommunications services and transmission
services in networks used for broadcasting, but
exclude services providing, or exercising editorial
control over, content transmitted using electronic
13 Article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC.
14 Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework
for electronic communications networks and services.
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include information society services15 which do
not consist wholly or mainly in the conveyance of
signals on electronic communications networks’’.
As indicated before, this definition underscores
that the regulation of the content as such must be
differentiated from the regulation of the trans-
mission. In principle, SmartHub assures the data
flow and interoperability between different appli-
cation providers and therefore enables a message
to be delivered, this irrespective of the communi-
cation protocols used. In this light, it is evident
that the service provided for consists of the
communication of a message, this irrespective of
its content.16
2. An electronic communications service
provided over a public network
Although the latter Directive does not contain
a definition of ‘‘public network’’, explicit refer-
ence is made to the definition given in Directive
2002/21/EC.17 According to this definition, a public
network can be considered as: ‘‘an electronic
communications network used wholly or mainly
for the provision of publicly available electronic
communications services’’.18 In the light of this
definition, one can be skeptic: a public network is
a network used to provide a public service.
Therefore, a second question needs to be an-
swered: what is a ‘‘publicly available electronic
communications service?’’
The answer hereto can be found in Directive
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights
relating to electronic communications networks
and service. Although the universal service obliga-
tions are limited to certain basic communication
services, a definition of a concept similar to the
one of ‘‘publicly available electronic communica-
tions services’’ can be found. In accordance with
article 2 (c) a publicly available telephone service
means: ‘‘a service available to the public for
originating and receiving national and interna-
tional calls and access to emergency services
through a number or numbers in a national or
international telephone numbering plan’’.
Nevertheless, this answer cannot be satisfactory
as it is circular: a public network is used to provide
15 Information society services are defined by Directive 98/34/
EC, as modified by Directive 98/48/EC.
16 In this regard, reference could be made to the definition of
electronic communications network, as defined in article 2 (a)
of Directive 2002/21/EC.
17 Cf., article 2 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
18 Article 2 (d) of Directive 2002/21/EC.a public service, i.e., a service available to the
public. In order to assess the private versus the
public character of a network or a service, and in
the absence of any other regulatory provision, one
may consider the former regulatory framework for
telecommunication services.19
3. Closed user group and private networks
For many years a ‘‘public service’’ was considered
tobeeverything that exceeds the scopeof aprivate,
corporate network or a closed user group. The latter
concepts are defined in a Communication of Octo-
ber 1995 on the implementation of Directive 90/
388/EEC on competition in the markets for tele-
communications services.
The Communication states that: ‘‘the term ‘for
the public’ is not defined in the Directive and must
beunderstood in its common sense: a service for the
public is a service available to all members of the
public on the same basis. Particular examples of
services which should not be considered ‘for the
public’, and thus should not be made subject to
special or exclusive right, are those provided over
corporate networks and/or to closed user groups.
Corporate networks and closed user groups
(CUGs) cover a number of telecommunications
services, both voice and data. They are fundamen-
tal to the Services Directive particularly because
they fall outside the scope of the voice service
which Member State may reserve to their tele-
communications organizations’’.
In the first place, ‘‘corporate networks’’ are
defined as those networks generally established by
a single organization encompassing distinct legal
entities, such as a company and its subsidiaries or its
branches in other Member States, incorporated
under the relevant domestic company law. Second-
ly, a ‘‘Closed User Group’’ (CUG) is defined as
a grouping of entities, not necessarily bound by
economic links, but which can be identified as being
(i) part of a group on the basis of a (ii) lasting
professional relationship among themselves, or
with another entity of the group, andwhose internal
communications needs result from (iii) the common
interest underlying this relationship. In general, the
link between themembers of the group is a common
business activity.
19 It must be stressed that the concepts used were introduced
before the 1999 ‘Telecom’ Review and the adoption of the
Directives in the field of electronic communications. In this
light, one should consider whether the concepts of CUG and
a network as defined in this Communication are still relevant or
accurate.
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fers in the financial sector, airline ticket reservation
systems, information transfers between universi-
ties involved in a common research project, can be
considered private services, this is not always the
case in a multi-application smart card scheme.
On the one hand, only selected and authorized
application providers may integrate their applica-
tion in an open smart card architecture. For this
reason, the network could be considered as private,
i.e., only the ‘‘certified’’ application providers may
provide their services to the smart card holder. On
the other hand, the service, i.e., a multi-applica-
tion smart card, is available to the public as such or
to all members of a certain community. In this light,
the application of the notion of CUG is not always so
evident. In its opinion on the proposal of Directive
COM (2000) 385,20 Group 29 stressed that personal
data processed for the use of closed/private net-
works would fall solely under the general Directive
95/46/EC. Furthermore, it stated that this was
regrettable because private networks were gaining
an increasing importance in every day life. This was
evident in the increase in communication between
individuals, such as in the workplace, and the
growth of specific risks to privacy that such net-
works created e.g. monitoring of employee
behaviour by means of traffic data or lack of
confidentiality of communications.
In the SmartCities Project, both the Southampton
City Council and the University of Southampton
have issued their own smart card. While everybody
can apply for the City Council’s card, the Universi-
ty’s smart card is only issued to its students and
staff. To the extent that the University community
could be considered a CUG, the service provided is
a private service and Directive 2002/58/EC is not
applicable. In contrast, the smart card issued by the
City Council is available to the public, this irrespec-
tive of one’s residence or nationality. Accordingly,
the service provided for has to be considered
a public service, subject to Directive 2002/58/EC.
Furthermore, it should be underlined that
SmartHub’s underlying technology can guarantee
the interoperability between local smart card
schemes and, therefore, become an important
factor in the establishment of pan-European smart
card schemes and networks. In this hypothesis, the
network of networks will reach out to most of the
European citizens, to the extent that the applica-
20 Article 29 WP, Opinion 7/2000 on the European Commission
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector,
12 July 2000, COM (2000) 385.tion of the concept of Closed User Group will
become very abstract. If SmartHub provides its
electronic service on public networks, the princi-
ples and privacy guarantees of Directive 2002/58/
EC have to be considered. In view of the proper
nature of the delivered service, i.e., transmission
and delivery of messages containing personal data,
the most important requirements relate to (i) the
secure and confidential character of the service21
and (ii) the processing of traffic data and location
data.
As to the security and confidentiality require-
ments, recital 20 of Directive 2002/58/EC states
that service providers should take appropriate
measures to safeguard the security of their services,
if necessary in conjunction with the provider of the
network, and inform subscribers of any special risks
of a breach of the security of the network. Such risks
mayespecially occur for electronic communications
services over an open network such as the Internet
or analogue mobile telephony. Furthermore, the
adopted securitymeasuresmust be appraised in the
light of article 17 of Directive 95/46/EC.
In relation to traffic data, i.e., data processed
for the purpose of the conveyance of a communi-
cation on an electronic communications network
or for the billing thereof,22 a particular regime has
been inscribed in article 6 of Directive 2002/58/
EC.23 In application of this article, traffic data
relating to subscribers and users, processed and
stored by the provider of a public communications
network or publicly available electronic communi-
cations service, must be erased or made anony-
mous when it is no longer needed for the purpose
of the transmission of a communication. In this
regard, it has to be underlined that the completion
of the transmission of a communication depends
on the type of electronic communications service
that is provided. For instance, for a voice tele-
phone call the transmission will be completed as
soon as either of the users terminates the connec-
tion. For electronic mail the transmission is com-
pleted as soon as the addressee collects the
message, typically from the server of his service
provider.24
21 Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2002/58/EC. See also recitals 20
and 21 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
22 Article 2 (b) of Directive 2002/58/EC.
23 Article 9 of Directive 2002/58/EC deals with location data
other than traffic data.
24 Recital 27 of Directive 2002/58/EC. See also recital 22 of
Directive 2002/58/EC on automatic, intermediate, and tran-
sient storage.
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Security Article 4 Article 17 
Confidentiality Article 5 Article 17 
Traffic data Article 6 Article 6 and recital 26 
Figure 2 Requirements under Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC.Although traffic datamay not be stored for longer
than necessary25 or must be made anonymous,26
a three-fold exception has been foreseen: in the
first place, traffic data necessary for the purposes of
subscriber billing and interconnection payments
may be processed. Such processing is permissible
only up to the end of the period duringwhich the bill
may lawfully be challenged or payment pursued.27
Secondly, traffic data may be processed for mar-
keting electronic communications services or for
the provision of value-added services, provided that
the subscriber or user to whom the data relate has
given his or her consent.28 Thirdly, Member States
may adopt legislative measures providing for the
retention of data for a limitedperiod justified on the
grounds of national security, defence, public secu-
rity, and the prevention, investigation, detection
and prosecution of criminal offences or of unautho-
rizeduseof theelectronic communication system.29
Although Directive 2002/58/EC leaves it to the
individual Member States to define traffic data and
to determine the conditions of data retention,30 it is
recommended that this be done in close coopera-
tion and consultation between the 25 Member
States. In particular, reference has to be made to
the initiatives of the European institutions in the
field of cyber crime. Under the Belgian presidency,
the European Council presented a proposal for
a Framework Decision on the retention of traffic
data and on access to this data in connection with
criminal investigations and prosecutions.31 One of
25 Cf., article 6.1 of Directive 95/46/EC.
26 Cf., recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC, according to which
anonymous data are not subject to data protection legislation.
27 In this regard, reference has to be made to article 6.1 (e) of
Directive 95/46/EC according to which personal data may no
longer be stored or processed than is necessary for the purposes
for which the data were collected.
28 Article 6.3 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
29 Articles 6 and 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC. See also recital 11
of Directive 2002/58/EC. In this regard, reference should be
made to the CTOSE project, which stands for Cyber Tools On-
Line Search for Evidence. www.ctose.org.
30 It should be noted that the Member States had to transpose
Directive 2002/58/EC before 31 October 2003. In the United
Kingdom, this directive was transposed by the Privacy and
Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003.
31 www.statewatch.org/news/2002/aug/05datafd.htm. See
also the data retention website of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, EPIC.www.epic.org/privacy/intl/data_
retention.html.the objectives of this Framework Decision is to
provide for a common understanding of the concept
of traffic data and to harmonize the conditions
under which traffic data may or must be retained.32
4. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing it is clear that the
distinction between private and public networks
is not easy to make. Furthermore, how can one
defend that a public group of users, e.g., the City
Card holders, do benefit from Directive 2002/58/
EC, while a private group, e.g., the University Card
holders, using the same card and services, are
denied the same level of protection. For these
reasons, the adoption of a more pragmatic view-
point can be defended.
Directive 2002/58/EC is not applicable to private
networks. Therefore, if one can be sufficiently sure
that the service or message stays within the private
network, for instance the University’s intranet, the
requirements imposed by the latter directive can be
left in the sidelines. However, from themoment the
service exceeds the private scope, e.g., leaves the
University network, the Directive becomes applica-
ble. In these circumstances it is submitted that the
service is provided over a public network, unless
otherwise demonstrated.
Furthermore, the Directive 2002/58/EC deals
with principles already covered by the general
data protection Directive 95/46/EC. The require-
ments in the field of security and confidentiality of
electronic communications,33 can be derived from
articles 16 and 17 of Directive 95/46/EC,34 appli-
cable to all networks irrespective of their private
or public character. Indeed, recital 10 of Directive
2002/58/EC confirms that Directive 95/46/EC ap-
plies in particular to all matters concerning the
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms
and it also applies to non-public communications
services.
32 Also see the Public consultation and workshop on traffic data
retention, European Commission, 16 June 2004. See also Pascal
Reynaud, ‘‘Sombre avenir pour les données de trafic.’’,
www.droit.be, 9 September 2004.
33 Articles 4 and 5 of Directive 2002/58/EC.
34 Section III of Directive 95/46/EC on confidentiality and
security of processing.
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services on a public or a private network, must
take adequate measures to guarantee the secure
and confidential nature of the personal data
processed and it may not store card data longer
than is necessary (Fig. 2).
E. Multi-application SC schemes:
conclusions and recommendations
The use of new technologies, such as the develop-
ment and implementation of multi-application
smart card schemes, is not without concerns for
one’s fundamental rights. More and more citizens,
throughout the European Union, will be confronted
with such schemes and the underlying privacy
issues e notably the use of global unique identifiers
for cross-profiling purposes. Nevertheless, it should
be emphasized that data protection legislation
should not impede its development and that the
opportunities offered by these schemes can be
reconciled with data protection and privacy princi-
ples. All parties involved e industry, policymakers
and citizens e should be aware of the associated
privacy concerns. On the one hand, the industry
should take into account that it is in their proper
interest to develop privacy-compliant products,
while on the other the confidence consumers have
in privacy-compliant products can be strengthened.
Smart card manufacturers need to adopt ap-
propriate technical measures to prevent the
unique identifier embedded in the smart card from
being accessed by all the scheme providers and
therefore becoming a global unique tracking iden-
tifier. This may be done by using a crypto random
function encrypting the smart card serial number
(SSN) with random noise.35
Application providers, in their role of data
controllers, have an overall liability with regard
to the legal obligations imposed by Directive 95/
46/EC. They have to take technical and organiza-
tional measures to prevent their personal data
being processed by other entities. In this respect,
they should not use the same identifier as other
applications of the same scheme.
The European Commission, by virtue of its
competences derived from Directive 1999/5/EC,
may take an initiative. Indeed, the latter Directive
grants the European Commission the competence
35 Cf., Part 2 of this paper, Jean-Marc Dinant and Ewout
Keuleers, ‘‘ Data protection : multi-application smart cards :
the use of global unique identifiers for cross-profiling purposes
e Part 2 : towards a privacy enhancing smart card engineer-
ing’’, [2004] 20 CLSR 22.to decide that an apparatus shall be so constructed
that it incorporates safeguards to ensure that the
personal data and privacy of the user or the
subscriber are protected.36 Furthermore, similar
provisions have been inscribed in Directive 2002/
58/EC on privacy and electronic communications.
According to its recital 46 and article 14, measures
may be adopted to ensure that terminal equip-
ment is constructed in a way that is compatible
with the right of users to protect and control the
use of their personal data. Recital 26 states more
explicitly that: ‘‘it may therefore be necessary to
adopt measures requiring manufacturers of cer-
tain types of equipment used for electronic
communications services, e.g., smart card manu-
facturers, to construct their product in such a way
as to incorporate safeguards to ensure that the
personal data and privacy of the user and sub-
scriber are protected’’.
Since telecommunication terminals may be
used e and are commonly used e for legitimate
but incompatible purposes by distinct data control-
lers, the presence of a global unique identifier raises
the major risk of purpose re-routing. In addition, it
mayenable illegal andprivacy-invadingglobal cross-
profiling activities. Similar towhathasbeendone for
mobile cell phones, the EuropeanCommission has to
make the suppression of the general availability of
a GUI a mandatory requirement before putting such
telecommunication terminals on the Europeanmar-
ket. This is now a matter of urgency as more and
more telecommunication terminals are transmitting
such a GUI (Ethernet Card, RFID’s,37 Smart Card,
etc.) to a growing amount of third parties.
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